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THE COLONIAL ROOTS OF INTERNAL CONFLIT IN UGANDA. 
By and large Independent Uganda has been characterised 
by violence and a dictatorial ruthless leadership; there has 
been a pervasive atmosphere of despondency and hopelessness 
amongst the majority of her people until recently. Viable 
political institutions have not developed, there is no basic 
consensus and the country is hopelessly divided. Indeed 
independence has become/traumatic and delibilitating ex-
perience . 
The purpose of this paper is to establish the role of 
colonialism in the postcolonial agony of Uganda, colonial-
ism we hope to demonstrate, failed.miserably, through omi-
ssion or commission to lay the foundations for the building 
of a nation out of the protectorate. The manner in which 
'protection' was effect the nature of the admini-
stration established ana the colonial economy imposed were 
the basic elements of which the recipe for tne chaos of the 
postcolonial period were formed. 
Both the sword and tue bible, those familiar twins of 
imperialism, were effectively wielded against the pre-
colonial leaderships and people of what emerged as the 
Uganda Protectorate at the Deginning of tnis century. Bible 
and sword became weapons oi division. The bible plunged a 
part of Uganda, Buganda, into a civil war in the ld80s which 
left her divided and weak, destroyed her monarchy in the 
process and left her an easy prey for incorporation into 
the British Empire by Captain Lugard and his motley crew 
in the 1890s. The divisions introduced by tne bible soon 
embraced what became the protectorate and these divisions 
still plague independent Uganda und influence her negative 
politics mightly, These divisions are a solid legacy of 
colonialism. 
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Between 1890 and 1920 imperialism wielded the sword 
in earnest to secure and pacify her colonial possession, 
Uganda. Those three decades were decades of violence, a 
time when the premium was put by imperialism on the esta-
blishment of law and Order, when the virtual, purpose of 
government was to- police the populace. Violence or the 
threat of the use of violence was used on many other 
occasions to put down the natives during tne colonial 
period. Imperialism was intorelant of opposition and 
relied more on the sword than on dialogue. It is thag 
legacy of violence that imperialism bequeathed to a whole 
generation of leadership in postcolonial Uganda. 
When Uganda acquired her final geographical shape in 
the early 1920s she embraced a people from three linguistic 
groups, namely: Sudanic, Nilotic and Bantu, from two major 
African language families - Nilo-Saharan and Congo - Kordo-
fanian.l There was very little or no linguistic and cultu-
ral affinity amongst these people and it should have been 
obvious to the people who brought them togetuer into one 
central protectorate administration that a lot of work had 
to be done to mould them into nationals of one country. 
This work was not done because British imperialism thrived 
on division and it was never her intention to create 
nation-states out of her colonies. 
The British conquered Uganda through the use of force 
and fraud and these two methods created wounds within the 
body-politic of U&anda that independence has not yet healed. 
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In 4he establishment of colonial rule the British used 
Africans to fight for them, Africans who then stayed 
under one acfcmistration with the conquered people and 
became citizens of the same country. Nubians and 
Buganda played, a prominent role in the conquest of 
Uganda and a bitterness transcending generations was 
created which is part of the tale of our more recent 
agonies. 
Nubians were used by Baker, Emin Pasha and Gordon 
to man forts in Acholi from the early 1870s to around 
1690. Pain notes that the behavour of the Nubian forces 
2 
left a bitter folk memory among the Acholi. On the eve 
of his sojourn into Uganda, in 1890, Captain Lugard 
assembled sevenltfNuDian askaris recruited for the 
Imperial British East African company by captain Williams 
in Egypt. In 1891 Captain Williams joined Captain Lugard 
in Buganda with another seventy five Nubian askaris. 
Lugard further sought the services of the remnants of 
Emin Pasha's troops unaer the command <Jf Selim Bey stra-
nded on the Zaire side of the Semliki river. In October 
1891 Selim Bey crossed the Semliki river into Toro with 
around two thousand Nubian soldiers and another thirteen 
thousand followers, women and ohildren. This Nubian co-
ntigent was further consolidated in 1894 when another 
ten thousand men and families under another Nubian comma-
nder, Fadhl-el-Maula were ferried into Bunyoro across 
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Lake Albert. It is these Nubians who helped defeat 
Bunyoro and Buganda in the 1890s and helped in the 
many pacification campaigns that the British carried 
out in Uganda and beyond up to the outbreak of the first 
world war. They formed the core of the Uganda fiifles 
establishsd,:in 1895. An essentially alien force had 
formed the core of the Colonial army in Uganda. Comment-
ing on the Nubian visitation H.H. Johnston, Uganda 
Commissioner (1899-1900), observed: 
"themselves ex-slaves, they had all the 
cruelty and unscrupulousness of the Arab 
slave-traders, wnose names, principles and 
religion they had inherited"-3. 
The British were aware of the cruilty and unscrupulous-
ness of the Nubians when they set them loose in Uganda) 
Apollo Kaggwa and oemei Kakungulu,.rival chiefs in 
Buganda, weru.used.extensively in the conquest of Uganda 
and a wrong impression was, therefore, created 
that Buganda per se was responsible ^or the conquest 
and that Buganda as a nation participated in the .grand 
designs :of British imperialism . in Uganda. If Buganda 
had participated as a nation then why was Mwanga a 
rebel? Why was he hunted like a wild beast by Kakungu-
lu? 
Between December 189j when colonel Colvile declared 
war on Bunyoro and I8y5 when conventional warfare came 
to an end thare, Kag^wa had deployed around twenty 
thousand men to fight tne Bunyoro. In 1897 when Mwanga 
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started "to struggle for the self-determination of 
Buganda in Buddu,Kaggwa again mobilized a large army 
to fight Buganda nationalists. Mwanga rendezvour ed 
with a Bunyoro general,- Ireta in May 1898 and crossed 
the Nile in July 1898 to Join Kabarega in Lango where 
they were both captured by gakungulu on 9th April 1899. 
Kakungulu, thereafter, encouraged by Johnston, the 
British Commissioner, eabarked on the conquest of 
eastern Uganda in the mistaken understanding that that 
the British would allow hia to establish a kingdom and 
a dynasty of his own as king of the Bakedi.^ thfe de-
predation of the Baganda mercenaries in Bunyoro and --
eastern Uganda left a bitterness that has not yet 
disappeared. Through their use of the Baganda to 
conquer Uganda the British had established a lasting 
hatred between the Baganda and a sizeable chunk of the 
rest of Uganda, weak premises on which to build a 
nation. With this all embracing deployment of the 
Baganda ^y the British a colonial myth was woven into 
the historiography of Uganda, namely that the Baganda 
had a long tradition of martial dominance over their 
neighbours ^ T o malce bitterness deeper, when 
the Banyoro were conquered, the British annexed all 
Bunyoro territory south of river Kafu to Bu^anda as 
a reward for the suppoft Kaggwa and his men had given 
to the British. This Bunyoro territory was incorpora-
ted into the kingdom of Buganda, when for the first 
time Buganda's boundaries were defined both on the 
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ground and on paper•in the ;1900 Uganda (Buganda) 
Agreement.® The territory excised from Bunyoro was 
estimated to have been-around one quarter of precolon-
ial Bunyoro territory and included the heartland of 
precolonial Bunyoro, Hiubende where the precolonial 
royal burial grounds were located. Colonialism 
created the problem of Bunyoro irridenta, a problem 
which the British avoided-to solve and thrust it 
upon Ugandan leaders, leaders who aid not create the 
problem in the first, instance, to solve on their de-
parture. 
Kaggwa's and Kakungulu's men were set up by the 
British, once conquest had been accomplished, as 
agents of their imperialism irx western and eastern 
Uganda. They were deployed as administrators whom 
Kabwegyere refers to as 'tutor raecnanics' to peddle 
the so called Kiganda model of administration.in other 
parts of the protectorate.' The missionaries used 
Baganda agents to peddle the catechism around as well. 
The Baganda had trully come unto their own as the 
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'Japanese of Africa1 , an accolade that did not endear 
them to their neighbours. Buganda became the favourite 
child of imperialism and aroused the envy of the other 
children. This partly explains the many skulls that 
now litter the Luwero Triangle. 
rt'here force was not used to conquer fraud was used. 
Fraudlent agreeiaunts w^re concluded between the British 
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and Buganda, Toro and Nkore at the beginning of this 
century providing for,the acceptance of British protec-
tion and loyalty to the British crown and establishing 
a local constitution. In a Privy Council judgement 
(Sdbhuza II vs Miller, 1926) it was established that 
agreements with. Native Rulers can never bind the British 
Q 
Crown. . Ibingira observes that agreements lacked the 
force of law and" bound /ferrtish crown during its 
pleasure.''"® Initially .the Native (agreement) rulers 
did neirkftow'that the agreements they concluded did 
. not have the force of law but'even'when they found out 
they continued the charade of the efficacy of these 
agreements. They, indeed, turned them into fortresses 
against Ugand&n nationalism. To this theme we shall 
return later. Suffice it to note that the British had 
created a big divide in Uganda between the agreement 
and non-agreement areas, a divide which soured political 
development in Uganda. 
Having used force and fraud to establish the pro-
tectorate the British proceeded to use the same means to 
maintain themselves in power. They established a force 
of internal coercion whose loyalty to them had to be 
ebove board. The Uganda Rifles Ordinance (1895) speci-
fically included a clause (clause 58) empowering the 
Uganda Rifles to take action against any local group(s) 
in the Protectorate which engaged in active opposition to 
to the administration. 
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The formation of a loyal force had exercised the 
minds of-the founders "of "tec-Uganda protectorate. 
According to -Lugard, the founding father of the colony, 
the Nubians constituted the best material for -soldiery 
•in Africa."1"'1" • By th<* beginning of this century and de-
finitely by the beginning of the First world war the 
British had made up their mind as to whom they wanted 
to man their colonial armies in Africa. They had 
evolved 'the martial tribes thesis1'. According to 
this thesis the- Central African 'races' possess mili-
tary qualities in direct proportion to the amount of 
12 
influence left by foreign invaders. In -the Uganda 
context "the Nilotic and Sudanic tribes of northern 
Uganda show signs of the effects of former Asiatic 
invasions to which they owe their war-like character-
istics" ^ Omara-Otuhuu argues convincingly that the 
factors governing the deployment of colonial troops 
were that" a soldier should be of a different 'race' 
from the people of' the area in which he is deplc ed, 
that he should be geog,rahically distant from the people 
into which he is•deployed and tnat he should be of a 
different religious faith frOrn the population "to 
which he is posted. The British tried as much as 
possible to look for soldiers who fulfilled some or 
all of tne above criteria. As a matter of policy 
colonial armies in Africa were recruited from 'remote' 
tribes detached and even hostile to tribes central to 
the colonies."1"^ In Ghana, for example, 6C$ of the 
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colonial a m y at the time of independence had to be 
recruited from the northern nationalities. In Nigeria, 
the Haasa dominated the colonial army and in Sierra 
Xeonar..it was the northern Karankos, the M<'*ndingos, the 
15 
puis- and the Limbe. ^ Those tribes were also largely 
.meslem, the religion preferred in the African colonial. 
forces. In Uganda the Nubians were ranked first in the 
order of preference because they were an entirely alien 
mercenary element who did not have any sentimental _ . . 
attachment .to Uganda and would be trusted to be bestial 
without any reserve or compuctiun. T-hey were also mo*- -
sl.eme which ensured that they remained safe from the 
virus of westernisation, a virus which was cultured 
through the agency of Christianity. 
At the end'of the 19th century (1897) the Nubians 
iiii.ijfcod themselves up tnrough the 'Sudanese Mutiny1, a . 
mutiny which became the most serious threat to the esta-
•blishment of colonial rule in Uganda the British had 
faced yet. The Baganda -and the Indians were called in 
to rescue the. Union Jack.^ The Nubians never quite 
nesreyercd their.ground within the colonial army and it 
was not until the overthrow of the first Obote regime 
in 1971 that they recovered their dominant position 
within the armed forces. By 1914 the Acnoli had gained 
the ascendancy; Omara-Otunnu observes, "the largest 
contigent (of soldiers) was recruited from the north, 
especially from the people of Acholi and by 1914 Acholi 
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had become the main recruiting ground for the K.A.R. 
(Kings' African Rifles) a pattern which continued well 
17 
into the postcolonial period". Omara-Otunnu argues 
that it was not the martial race concept that guided 
the British into recruiting Acholi; the Acholi were the 
ones who offered least resistance to the establishment 
of British rule. He further notes: 
"The Acholi were preferred to the Baganda 
because of their political disposition. 
Having been exposed to British rule for 
longer, the Baganda were familiar with 
the British and were more assertive of 
their interaction with them. Whereas 
the Baganda were percieved by British 
military officers to be arrogant and 
in-subordinate, it was hoped that the 
Acholi would be-more amenable to the 
authority of the British. The Acholi 
were also preferred because tney had 
very loosely organised and territor-
ially small political and military 
units. So large-scale military mobi-
lisation under a single political 
leadership was impossible" . Its 
(emphasis added) 
It is not true that the Acholi offered the least 
"resistance to the establishment of colonial rule. Be-
tween 1911 and 1912 the Lamogi people of Acholi rebelled 
against the British and considerable resources were 
deployed by the British to put down this rebellion. A 
19 
lot of lives were lost amongst the Lamogi, What endo.i-
red the British and to northerners in general was their 
romOteness from the centre of the country, their relative 
lack of the trappings of western civilization and their 
rather single political and military organisational 
backgrounds. Around these factors was woven the myth 
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of the martial races of the north, a myth which pro-
spered daring the colonial period and until. .January 
1986 when the remnants of the Kings' African Rifles 
were at .JLast driven from power in Kampala. So power-
ful was the iayth that the northerners believed that they 
were the only ones who had been divinely ordained to 
bear arms in Uganda while the rest believed that 
they were incapable of bearing them. 
The colonial army remainly largely invisible. 
Since independence,in 1962, ana especially after the 
1964 sjutiny of the Uganda Army the army became very 
visible and a key institution in the political life 
of the country, s°13iers have maintained that visibi-
lity and importance up to tii-day. This key institu-
tion was neither national nor nationalist and given 
the above background, it could not have been expected 
to have been so. A lot of internal conflict leading 
to virtual genocide in some parts of Uganda in the 
ijore recent past arose over the fact that this key 
institution of the postcolonial period was built on 
the British foundations of remoteness and hostility 
to people in the centre of the country, colonialism 
built up the army as an instrument of coercion, as a 
pacifying army and not as a peoples' force to cater 
for their defence against external aggression. Until 
recently the army in Uganda was an instrument of inter-
nal coercion. It could not be trully national because 
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some Ugandans were not thought or meant to have the 
precious martial qualities which the British had attri-
buted to Ugandans of northern origin. This concept 
beautifully fitted Obote and Amin. Both were northerners 
who clearly appreciated the political advantages of 
having armies where they had a close linguistic and 
cultural link. So confident was Obote about this 
linkage that in the campaigns leading to the general 
election of December 1980 he could ask his rivals, the 
leaders of the other political parties who happened to 
come from the south and west of the country, where 
their army was and if they did not have them , he asked 
them how they hoped to take power. To Obote, with his 
ethnic array in place, the ballot was irrelevant. For 
some twenty four years of Uganda's independence the 
hegemony of the north was made possible by the faithful 
persuit of colonial policies in the recruitment and 
deployment of the army and by actually retaining K.A.R. 
veterans of the colonial era, veterans who had only 
20 
little or no education at all, as the military leaders." 
It is no coincidence at all that all the defeated armies 
and factions of armies from the Amin coup d'etart of ^ 7 1 
to the debacle of the Okellos in January 1986 have re-
tired to the north and beyond into the southern Sudan and 
northeastern Zaire to take refugee amongst their relatives 
and it is no coincidence that arraed opposition to the 
National Resistance Movement government is from the north. 
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This is one of the most bitter legacies of colonialism. 
prom the triunph of conquest the British moved on 
to the next logical stage requisite to the consolidation 
of power, namely to administration. A dual system was 
devised, that of native authorities and a central ad-
ministration . In the domain of native administrations 
the boundaries of the native authorities were delineated, 
wherever possible, alon^ ethnic lines. So that with a 
few exceptions of the districts of west Nile, Bugisu, Buke-
di, Toro and Kigezi where the ethnic units were not 
considered viable enough for each of them to form a 
district, in the rest of Uganda native authorities 
coincided with ethnic boundaries. This ethnic deli-
neation of administrative boundaries did not cnange 
even after independence. 
To accompany the ethnic delineation of boundaries 
was the indirect rule policy which was introduced by 
Lugard, first in northern Nigeria but which, in time, 
came to embrace the whole of British Africa. Cohen obser-
ves that the policy of indirect rule developed as a 
result of local initiative without the policy being 
laid -down from London and that it was not until the 1930s 
that the Colonial Office began to encourage the persuit 
21 
of such a policy. That great historian of British 
Africa, M. Perham found merit in the policy of indirect 
rule because it broke the shock of western annexation, 
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was economical, kept the peace and induced a sympathetic 
inquiring attitude in colonial officials towards African 
22 
Society. This policy of indirect rule held centre 
stage in the field of administi'ation and politics in 
Uganda until the late 1940s when in a despatch to the 
colonies the Colonial Secretary Creech-Jones in 1947 
enunciated a new policy on local government aimed at 
converting the system of indirect rule into a demo-
cratic efficient and modern system of local govern-
ment. It is this despatch which led to the enact-
ment of the Local Government Ordinance in 1949. This 
ordinance gave legal and corporate powers and res-
ponsibilities to the district councils and introduced 
the elective principle within local administrations. 
The ordinance, however, did not apply to Buganda. On 
analysing the ordinance Burke reaches the conclusion 
that "as the administrative districts (including king-
doms) generally coincided with tribal residence, the 
1949 ordinance in effect provided for the institu-
tionisation of parochial tribally oriented local 
governments". 
Within tne domain of native administrations Buganda 
was governed by the Uganda Agreement of 1900 and the 
rest of Uganda by the Native Authority Ordinance of 1919, 
a constitutional arrangement which emphasized the divi-
sion between Buganda and the rest of the country. 
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Although Buganda was legally just another province of 
Uganda and although the agreement, as noted earlier, 
bound the British crown at its pleasure and waa not 
justifiable, Ibingira observes that agreements with 
African rulers were for political reasons strictly 
adhered to by the British rulers who departed from 
them only in rare cases when it seemed in the best 
interests of peace, good feOvernment or imperial autho-
rity to do so.2^ 
Many historians of Bu^anda emphasize the importance 
of the agreement in creating the distance between Buganda 
and the rest of the country. Morris argues that: "the 
kingdom of Buganda stood in a completely different 
position from the rest of xhe country. In Buganda 
there existed what may conveniently, if not accurately, 
be termed a native state, whose relationship with the 
Protectorate Government was defined in considerable 
OR detail by the terms of the Agreement of 1900". 
In a book published this year Omara-Otunnu asserts: 
"the agreement ensured for them (the Baganda) a previle-
ged status vis-a-vis the rest of Uganda, thereby fegu-
larising and fostering inequalities between Buganda and 
the other provinces of the country."26 S o w h e t h e r o r 
not Buganda's agreement gave Buganda a special and pre-
vileged position in Uganda that is what botn the Baganda 
and non-Baganda believed. The British encouraged this 
belief although legally Buganda was just another province 
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of Uganda. This con'situtional division made the unity 
of Uganda extremely difficult to achieve and was a 
potentirail cause of conflict in independent Uganda. 
Indirect rule operated within the framework of the 
Uganda Agreement and the Native Authority Ordinance. 
Perhaps Pratt's definition of indirect rule is 
as good as any. He says that by indirect rule is meant 
the appointment of tribal chiefs as agents of local 
rule - the use in local government of those men whom 
27 
the people were accustomed to obey. In Uganda, despite 
the claims to the contrary, classical indirect rule 
as was practised by Lugard in northern Nigeria could 
not be applied to the whole of Uganda and "indirect rule" 
was imposed wholesale on the atomistic societies of 
the east and north of Uganda where the search for the 
traditional authorities proved to be an uphill task. 
Buganda had a highly centralised and hierarchical 
system of traditional administration. Although the 
monarchy had become seriously emasculated by 1900, the 
rest of the traditional administration still held. It 
was a system much admired by the British. So the'Kiganda 
model' of administration was exported to the rest of 
Uganda. The model was accompanied by experts, from Buganda, 
the agents who imposed it wherever the British established 
a civilian administration. This imposition of the 'kiganda 
model' went against the grain of classical indirect rule 
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where the native traditional authorities had to be the 
agents of indirect rule. The failure to find the indi-
genous chief or in some cases where these were available, 
to use them, and the imposition of Buganda agents caused 
much bitterness and trouble. In Bunyoro, for example, 
the imposition of the 'kiganda model' and agents led to 
the Nyangire Revolt in 1907, a revolt that Uzoigwe dubs 
9 o 
a passive revolt against British overrule. There were 
many much revolts in the east and weBt of the country, 
revolts which forced the British to withdraw the agents 
from most of Uganda by 1930. Peoples' anger was directed not 
so-much against the British as against the Baganda and 
this agency system sharpened the cleavage between the 
Baganda and the non-Baganda. The British were adept at 
diverting peoples' anger against themselves but in the 
process of diverting this anger they removed the possibi-
lity of the development of a genuine national conscious-
ness amongst the people of Uganda. Their system of ad-
ministration had created enemies amongst the people of 
Uganda. 
In some areas where the native authorities were not 
coterminous with ethnic groupings secessionist movements 
developed as was the case in Toro. So serious was the 
Bamba and Bakonzo grievances that in March 1962 they formed 
the Rwenzururu Movement. Isaaya Mukirane, their leader, 
asked for a separate district for the Bamba and Bakonzo 
complaining that seventy years of being ruled as slaves 
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by an alien and arrogant people should be ended. 
In June 1962, Mukirane established the kingdom of 
Rwenzururu, comprising the counties of Bwamba, Bunya-
ngabu, and Busongora, and declared Rwenzururu an indepe-
ndent state, The Rwenzururu movement maintained its 
momentum on and around the fiwenzori mountains until 
the second ruler of the Mukirane dynasty, Charles 
Iremangoma came down the mountain, in 1983 and handed 
over his kingdom to the Uganda Government.^0 Even after 
the handover there are still lingering sentiments of 
Rwenzururu nationalism to-day. The Kwenzururu movement, 
for a good twenty years, tied down considerable resources 
in an attempt to suppress it. Lives and property were 
lost and the real cost of that conflit has not yet been 
worked out. Even in the divide and rule game the British 
were not purists. The Bamba and Bankonzo wanted a dis-
trict of their own since they-were badly treated by their 
Batoro overlords, who actually.engaged in name-calling, 
imposed on them by the British. The British ar6ued that 
a Bamba and Bakonzo district would not be economically 
viable and yet throughout the colonial period around 
70$ of the revenues of Toro originated in the counties 
of Bwamba, Bunyangabu and Busongora. At times the British 
simply paid lipservice to indirect rule in concrete si-
tuations where the policy would have worked well.- A 
state of neither unity nor disunity was sometimes foster-
ed by British imperialism to the great suffering of its 
subjects. 
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Throughout the colonial period, government meant 
local administration to most people. The protectorate 
administration at Entebbe remained remote and the 
people largely uninvolved in it. To most people the 
protectorate administration was a whiteman's affair. 
It remained mysterious and was deliberately mystified 
by the colonial administrators. It is true that the 
people, from time to fime saw the District commissioner 
on baraza. That was the limit to which protectorate 
administration stretched itself in most cases. The 
daily and basic concerns of the ordinary people were 
taken care of by the local or native administrations. 
Very few people looked beyond their local administra-
tions either to the other local administrations or to 
the protectorate administration and those who did 
were looked upon as trouble makers by the protectorate 
administration. 
During the inter-war period British colonial 
policy makers began to think aoout the future of their 
colonies. They envisaged the possibility of self-
government within the British Commonwealth for their 
colonies but at some remote future not yet on the hori-
zon and they believed that they had almost unlimited 
time in which to work on the political development of 
the natives. Indeed where self-government was mentioned 
a\ all it was casually presented as the end product of 
iniirect rule. Even when the British began to envisage 
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self-government "in "the remote future they continued 
to regard Uganda merely as an administrative unit 
and never in terms of a nation. 
Peoples' participation in or the creation of 
national institutions were not encouraged, por exa-
mple, in 19-22 there was a suggestion that an African 
Central Assembly should be formed to provide all the 
natives of Uganda with a single political forum but 
this suggestion was vetoed by the Governor. Again in 
1925 the Governor vetoed a meeting proposed for the 
leaders of Buganda, Bunyoro, Busoga and Toro. When 
both the Legislative and Executive Councils were esta-
blished by Order-in-Council in 1920, the Legislative 
Council became a planters' and merchants' forum for 
the championing °f European and African political and 
economic interests. Africans did not gain access to 
the Legislative council until 1944 and to the Executi-
ve council until the early 1950s. 
Representative institutions were opposed by imper-
ialism and the basis of the colonial state was auto-
cracy. How could a legacy of autocracy translate into 
democracy overnight once independence was granted? It 
was feared that representative institutions may diverj 
the attention of the educated Africans away from their 
tribal institutions and bring these detribalized Africans into 
prominence. Imperialism also made the false .claim 
that the educated Africans were unrepresentative and 
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more importantly that they would be less amenable 
to official guidance than the native administration 
chiefs. British policies, both directly and indirectly 
favoured and aided the continuation of tribal loyalties 
and blocked the development of supra-tribal links 
and the participation of Africans in centralising 
or nationalising institutions. 
Natives like Kulubya were the favourite children 
of imperialism because they went along beautifully 
with their masters when it came to preventing Uganda from 
becoming a nation. Asked why he was opposed to represe-
ntation in the Legislative council, Kulubya answered that; 
"If we get a representative in the Legislative council 
it is quite possible that with one or two representatives 
that he will be outvoted... by the majority and when he 
has been outvoted in that way it wiljL be difficult for 
us to open the questions because we have our represent-
ative there"-^ (emphasis added). Clearly Kulubya was 
thinking in the narrow terms of Bu^andaj the _us and the 
outvoting was within the Buganda context. These re-
presentatives were not concieved to persue the interests 
of Uganda but those of Bu&anda. It is that thinking that 
directly lead to the rejection of direct elections in 
Buganda, to the advocacy of electoral college status for 
fhe Lukiiko in the 1962 elections, to the formation of 
Kabaka Yekka to act as a power broker in the National 
Assembly and ultimately to the desecration of Mutesa II's 
Kingdom in 1966.34 
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The nature and shape Of self-governing Uganda exer-
cised "the minds of colonial policy makers during the 
inter-war period and more specifically after the Second 
world war. The'format w^s percievea in terms of a loose 
federation of independent native states, in an assembly 
of native authority delegates to stand alongside the 
Legislative Council which would eventually have powers 
and a status equal to it, in terms of regional councils 
of native authority and urban representatives to which 
eventually wide delegations of power would be given and 
also in terms of a central assembly whose members would 
be drawn from the native authorities. At this junct-
ure metropolitan institutions were deemed unsuitable for 
the politically primitive colonies such as Uganda was. 
And yet at independence we were bequeathed the West-
minister model! 
As noted earlier, Creech-Jones, Colonial Secretary, 
issued a new local government policy in a despatch to 
the governors in 1947. This new policy was intended to 
offer the possibility of building a foundation of local 
democracy on which the structure of parliamentary 
government was, hopefully, to be based. In Uganda the 
despatch was translated into the Local Government Ordi-
nance of 1949. This ordinance did not apply to Buganda 
at all and it was rejected in several other places 
as well.-^ So the new policy was not the democratising 
agent it was concieved to be and was superceded by the 
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District Councils (District Administrations) Ordinance 
of 1955 where the district councils emerged as the 
local authorities in charge of a variety of local 
services and with an increased access to finance to 
•57 
take on the services. The new style local admini-
strations spawned local noteables who represented their 
respective largely ethnically homogeneous districts 
in the Legislative council. Many of them peddled anti-
colonialist slogans but they were by no means nationals 
ists having a Uganda-wide consciousness or appeal. 
They represented the narrow interests of their districts 
and not those of Uganda as a whole. Obote, for exa-
mple, who became Prime Minister of Uganda in April 
1962, could, as late as 1960,accept the chairmanship 
of the Lango District Council! This is the kind of 
politician that the colonial policies of indirect rule 
and parochialism had helped create. Once the anti-
colonialist rhetoric was over would these brand of 
politicians be aole to forge a nation or would they 
use the central government bequeathed by imperial-
ism to advance parochial interests to which they were 
accustomed during the colonial period? It is signi-
ficant than an insignificant number of politicians 
stood outside their tribal areas of origin for elect-
ions either before or after independence.-^ 
In the 1950s the British persued a contradictory 
policy in Uganda. Cohen tells us that the policy was 
on the one hand to build up central institutions, 
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namely the executive and the legislative and on the 
other to build up the political and social institutions 
of each part of the country. In Bu^anda this meant the 
giving of the Lukiiko an elected majority and the Buganda 
Government a ministerial system of its own and in the 
rest of the country an increased elected element in 
the district councils. How could both central and local 
institutions be strengthened concurrently? Was not 
imperialism setting the two on a corrison sourse? 
In the persuit of this policy the Buganda Agreement of 
1955 virtually created a state within the state situa-
tion for which Uganda has had to pay in considerable 
blood?-^ Burke.1remarks on the development of local 
government in the 1950s is instructive. 
He says: 
"Local government in Uganda had develo-
ped in the shadow of the Uganda Agree-
ment. The qua si-sovereign status of this 
large kingdom encourged the smaller and 
less powerful monarchies to acquire a 
similar status. The prestige, ceremony 
and special previleges surrounding the 
kingdom governments in turn, colored the 
development of local government through-
out the remainder of the country. Not 
only were British administrators accusto-
med to thinking.in terms of special 
agreements, prior consultation, hereditary 
deference, but the leaders of the newly 
emergent non-monarchical districts were 
quick to emulate the kingdoms and to 
demand similar prerogatives for themselves. 
Thus in contrast to Kenya and Tanganyika 
local government in Uganda evolved in a 
quasi-federal milieu."-.40 
In the first year of Uganda's independence (1962-63) 
most of the non-monarchical districts appointed, their 
district constitutional heads and districts competed with 
- 25 -
each other in their imagination to invent impressive 
titles for "their constitutional heads.4"1' Each district 
became a mini-state with its constitutional non-heredi-
tory monarch. This was the quasi-federal milieu and 
yet Uganda was not a federal state. The 1962 independ-
ence constitution was a composite one consisting of ele-
ments of unitarism, federalism and semi-federalism, 
not the basis for a successful forging of a peaceful 
and united nation. The contradic&ry policies refer-
red to earlier persued by the great reformer Sir Andrew 
Cohen, unintended by him, were to lead to tne constitu-
tional crises of the 1960s, crises that were moderated 
by the sword. If Sir Andrew nad been less timid he 
would have seized the opportunity offered by the de-
portation of Ssekabaka Mutesa II, in 1953, to impose 
a unitary system on Uganda across the board and he was 
enclined towards unitarism. Instead Cohen and his less 
able successors at Entebbe allowed constitutional develo-
pment to drift helplessly without any real guidance 
or indeed policy. In order to muddle through the co-
nstitutional jungle of the 1950s and early 1960s prior 
to independence the British-appointed commission after 
constitutional commission in order to buy time, time 
to jettison the colony and set it adrift after a decent 
42 period of constitutional development confusion. 
The r « a I- problem was that the British neither 
dared to agree nor to disagree with Buganda. They 
- 26 -
simply' muddled through the- constitutional problems with 
a;s much dissimulation as only the British can-muster. 
The constitution which the Btitish bequeathed to 
Uganda at independence was a real disaster. 
It is true tnat..Africans were brought into the 
legislative Council at a reasonable pa.ce in the 1950si 
it is true that Cohen promised direct elections by 
1961 and appointed the first African ministers to his 
Executive council in 1955. It is also true that in 
1958 some members of the Legislative Council were 
directly elected by the people for the first time 
in the history of Uganda. Karamoja, Bugisu, Ankole 
and Buganda were not part of this exercise - a size-
able chunck of the country. In the 1961 general 
elections the Mengo establishment maneuvered Bu^anda 
4 ^  
into almost completely boycotting the poll. J Uganda 
had very little experience in the operation of the 
parliamentary democratic system and most of Uganda's 
leaders joined the Legislative Council, for the first 
time, in 1961, on the eve of independence. Somehow, 
with this preparation the British expected our leaders, 
without any experience behind them, to operate the 
Westminister model successfully! Besides, colonial 
regulations had prevented civil servants from part-
icipation in politics so that, in the main, politics 
attracted people who were unemployed or unemployable. 
As Professor Ingo Von Munch observes, 'politicians 
without a profession are a great misfortune1.'''4 
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That was Uganda's misfortune at independence because 
..political practices imported without modification 
from. the. metrupolis were imposed in the colonies. 
These type of politicians looked for security of 
tenure in political posts. So how could they have 
been democratically removed? 
During the colonial period very little effort 
was made to train Africansfor responsibilities in 
the civil service. Although some three ministers 
were appointed by Cohen in 1955, there were very few 
senior African civil servants, for example the first 
Assistant District Commissioners were not appointed 
until 1958 and thore was no Africanspemanent secre-
tary until after independence. Pratt had this to 
say on the matter, "There were still no Africans in 
the provincial administration in responsible positions. 
In 1951, for example, only five Africans had senior 
posts in the Protectorate departments. There was 
therefore, in these crucial years no serious efforts 
made to build the institutions and to train the men 
for the self-government that ..ould come far sooner 
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than Entebbe dared admit. It is clear that 
the British intended to retain residual responsibi-
lities in Uganda. This was a ^isreadaa^ of post-
colonial nationalism. 
Ugandahs had no common language and still have no 
common language in which to communicate to one another 
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and how can a people who cannot communicate to one 
another really become united? 
In the inter-war period there were attempts by 
the colonial government to introduce Kiswahili in the 
school curriculum and between 1930 and 1943 the teaching 
of Kiswahili was enforced in primaries three and four 
outside Buganda but after that the policy was to sub-
ordinate vernaculars (and that apparently included 
kiswahili) to english. At a conference on language 
education policy in 1945 it was decided that, "the 
development of a lingua franca has very little connec-
tion with immediate expediency, being essentially co-
ncerned with enduring values and hence with a penetra-
tion which, however gradual, shall steadily become 
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co-extonsive with the country". Applying these crite-
ria neither Kiswahili nor Luganda nor any other 're-
mainder' had admissable claims. The policy was there-
fore, to encourage english and kiswahili was abandoned. 
Kiswahili was seen by the christian leadership, which 
was very influential during the colonial period, as the 
language of Islam and they discouraged it. To the Bu-
ganda conservatives kiswahili was seen as the language 
of prostitutes and thieves. Kiswahili was maintain-
ed in the colonial army and after independence Kiswahili 
acquired notoriety as the language of violence. 
In spite of a colonial language policy intent 
on the promotion of english, throughout the colonial 
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period english was only taught from the upper primary 
classes onwards and by the time most Ugandans ended 
their formal eduoation (primary six) they normally 
had had only two years of english and never really 
learnt the language to have been able to communicate 
effectively. So, unlike Tanganyika and Kenya, Ugandans, 
because of what happened to kiswahili in 1945 cannot 
yet communicate to each otner across the board. This 
is a serious impediment to unity, again a legacy of 
colonial bungling. 
Colonies were basically looked upon as sources 
of raw materials needed to feed the industries of 
their owners and as markbts for their manufactures. 
The colonial economies were, tnerefore, geared to this 
basic function and not to tne development of the eco-
nomies and peoples in the colonies. The little de-
velopment that did take place was incidental to the 
basic functions of colonial economies. The infra-
structure that was developed was designed to facili-
tate the movements of raw materials from the colonies 
and the social infrastructure was largely developed 
by non-governmental organisations but mainly mission-
aries. Cohen tells us that, "tnere was more emphasis 
put on the protection of African society than on 
helping Africans to develop and this opinion perva-
ded the colonial office'.1 ^  The corner-stone of 
Gladston's finance principles was self-sufficiency 
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and self-sufficiency was the policy which guided the 
colonial administrations for most of the colonial 
period. Grants-in-aid were grudgingly given by the 
British Treasury and then only in cases of extreme 
difficulty. Deficit financing was not allowed at all. 
Uganda was considered to be self-sufficient 
in 1915 and grants-in-aid from the British Treasury 
were stopped. This policy was modified somehow at 
the beginning of the Second World War, when through 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, British 
money was made available through the Colonial Deve-
lopment Corporation for social and economical deve-
lopment. The amounts were small and had come late. 
In 1903 colonialism found a raw material that 
Uganda could produce - cotton to which the peasants 
literally became slaves. King cotton and plantation 
rubber, cocoa and later coffee divided the country 
into "productive" and "non-productive" zones, Zones 0 
of production and labour recruitment respectively. 
This division of Uganda into two economic zones had 
dangerous political and social ramifications. 
Cotton was first introduced into Buganda and 
then into the Eastern province mainly because of 
easlar communications - water and rail transport 
being available. European planters also established 
their plantations mainly in Buganda, Bunyoro and 
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Busoga, again mainly for ease of communications. 
These, therefore, in British colonial officialdom 
became the "productive" zones and the rest of the 
country, the north and the west, the. "non-product-
ive" zone by the early 1920a. There was a delibe-
rate policy of holding back agricultural development 
of the "non-productive" zone.. In 1925 the Director 
of Agriculture who was not yet aware of tnis policy 
or had overlooked it started encouraging cotton pro-
duction in flest Nile but was curtly warned by the 
Chief Secretary that "the policy of government is 
at present to refrain from actively stimulating the 
production of cotton or other economic crops in out-
liying districts on wnicn it is dependant for a su-
pply of labour for the carrying out of essential 
services in the central producing districts."4® 
This policy had the effect of it-oping the "non-pro-
ductive" zone underdeveloped because most the able-
bodied men imigrated to the "productive" zone to 
labour in the cotton fields and in the rubber, 
coffee and coooa plantations. It also enclucated 
inferiority and superiority complexes amongst 
Ugandans along tne "non-productive"/"productive" 
z^nes axis. The Ormsby-Gore Commission warned: 
"When amon6 such people as the Baganda and Basoga, labourers were introduced 
who came from tribes considered inferior 
and who worKed under conditions which 
tho Baganda and the Basoga could not 
themselves accept the latertended to 
feel that unskilled manual labour was 
a form of employment suitable only for 
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inferior tribes. There was 
even - a danger that the que-
tion night in time bec.ome.one 
of 1 caste 1."49 
So., colonial economic policy had help-.d bring 
about a polarisation amongst Ugandans and hid in-
advertently encouraged "development in the "produc-
tive" zone and by the same token prevented d^velo-
ment in the "non-productive" zone. Unfortunately the 
colonial economic structures are still with us and 
there has been very little effort made since indape-
ndence to take development tu the "non-productive" 
zone especially to the north of the country. The 
enthusiasm with which the destruction of property vas 
undertaken in the Luwero Triangle was a logical co-
. ncluBion to the colonial economic policies. The two 
zones were evening scores. 
Since there were no raw materials to extract 
from the "non-productive" zone there was also no need 
to develop infrastructure and there was therefore 
total neglect of this zone. The economic zoning of 
the country is perhaps the most terrible legacy of 
British imperialism which was to invariably lead to 
conflict in the absence of a vigorous economic plan 
for the 11 non-productive" Zone after independence. 
We have been independent for almost a quarter of 
a century and we cannot indefinitely continue to 
harangue the imperialists for the chaos t! obtains 
in our country. If the will is tne re, »/e csj begin 
to build viable political economic and social insti-
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tutions but in this effort there will not be much to 
learn from our former colonial masters. The Westmi-
nister model is not easy to replicate. It will not 
be easy to replicate the economic revolutions that turn-
ed British into an industrialiased society ; we have 
to establish our own .paths to political social and 
economic development but above all we have to reme-
mber that we as Ugandans have one destiny and that 
we shall rise or sink together. 
- 34 -
FOOT NOTES. 
1. For a detailed survey of the linguistic complexity 
of Uganda, see-, • Ladefoged, Glick and Criper, 
Language in Uganda, Part I, (Nairobi: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1971). 
2. D.R. Pain, 
3. H.H. Johnston, 
4. A. Roberts, 
5. P.G. Powesland, 
"Acholi and Nubians: Economic 
Forces and Military Employment," 
PP.23-36; in c.P. Dodge et,al, 
Beyond Crisis: Social Develo-
u&nt in Uganda. Proceedings 
of a UNlCEF/fcAKERSRE UNIVERSITY 
Seminar, Mweya Lodge, lst-6th, 
April, 1986. 
The Uganda Protectorate, Vol. 
ITT (London: Hutchinson & Co. 
1902) pp.237-8. 
"The Sub-imperialism of the Ba-
ganda" , Journal of African 
History, Vol.Ill, No.3, 1962, 
PP.435-450. 
Economic Policy and Labour, 
(East African Studies No.10, 
Kampala: EAISR, 1957) p.25. 
6. por a comprehensive study of the agreement, 
see, J.V. Wild, The Story of the Uganda Agree-
ment (Nairobi; The Eafele 
Press, 1950). 
The Politics of State Forma-
tion: The Nature and Effects 
of Colonialism in Uganda, 
(Nairobi: East African Litera-
ture Bureau, 1974), p.175. 
The Uganda Protectorate 
op cit, p.301 
Quoted in G.S.K. Ibingira, The Forging of an 
African Nation (New YorK/Kampala: Viking and Uganda 
publishing House, 1973), p.13. 
7. T.B. Kabwegyere, 
8. H.H. Johnston, 
10. Ibid, pp.14-15. 
11. Quoted in D.R. Pain, "Acholi and the Nubians,.. 
p. 25. 
12. H, Moyse-Bartlett, 
13. Ibid. 
The King's African Kifles 
(Aldershot: Gale & Poiaen, 
1956) p. 139. 

- 36 -
28. G.N.Uzoigwe, "The Kyanyangire, 1907: Passive 
Revolt against British Overrule", 
in B.A. Ogot (ed), War and Society 
in Africa, (London: Frank Cass, 
1972), pp.179-214. 
29. F.G. Burke, Looal Government...., p. 233. 
30. For a more detailed study of the movements; see M. 
^nhuka, "The Origin and Develo-
pment of the Rwenzururu Movement, 
1900-1962, Mawazo vol.5, No.2, 
December, 19»3, pp.60-75. 
31. BarazaB were open air meetings called by colonial 
administrations to listen to 
peoples' grievances and problems. 
32. The first Africans to be appointed to the Executive 
Council in 1952, wore Mukasa and 
Kulubya and to the Legislative 
Council in 1945, Kawalya-Kaggwa, 
Zirabaauzaale and Nyangabyaki. 
33. Report of the Joint Select committee on Closer Union, 
vol.II, 1931, P. 57T. 
34. Obote unilaterally abrogated the 1962 independence 
constitution and replaced it with 
his own constitution, in which he 
made himself executive president 
and removed the fedsral status of 
Buganda and the semi-federal 
status' of the western kingdom, 
making Uganda a unitary state. 
35. These views are minimised in R . c . Pratt, "The politics 
of indirect Rule"...,' p.278. 
36. Busoga and Bunyoro did not welcome this ordinance. 
37. For a more detailed account of the Legislation 
see C.A.G. Wallis, Report of an 
Inquiry into African Local Govern-
ment"**^ the Protectorate of Uganda, 
(Entebbegovernment Printer, 1953). 
38. J. Kakonge stood in the East Mengo constituency of 
Buganda and not in his native Bu-
nyoro and was returned in the 
general elections of 1961 simply 
because that constituency was 
dominated by the Lugazi Sugar 
estates where the workers who were 
the dominant voters were not of 
local origin. Daudi Ochieng was 
to go to the National Assembly in 
1962 as a Kabaka Yekka member 
- 37 -
for although he was not a 
muganda he was a great 
friend of Ssekabaka 
Mutesa II. 
39. Between 1964 and 1965, stsrting with the Naku-
i&bye incident in which 
police opened fire and killed 
innocent people at a night 
due, through the large scale 
killings Buganda made follow-
ing the 196b constitutional 
changes to tne Luwero Triangle 
Genocide of the 1980s, the 
blood-letting in Buganaa was 
tluiost endless. 
40. F.G. Burke, Local Government.... , p. 230 
41. The Langi got a Won-nyaci, the Sebei, the Kingoo, the 
Bakiga, the Rutakirwa, the Bu-
kedi District, the Senkulu and 
so on. 
42. The following reports were produced: 
(i) Reports of the constitutional 
COMiuittee^ (Entebbe: Govern-
ment Printer, 1959.) 
(ii) Report of the Uganda Rela-
tionsnip Commission,(Entebbe: 
Government printer, 1961). 
(iii) Report of The Constitutional 
Conference, HiViSO: Command 
Papor, o.l523, 1961). 
43. Only y/o of the potential voters in Buganda registered 
for the poll in the 1961 
general election. 
44. Quoted in the German Tribune, No.275 31st May, 1967. 
45. R.C. Pratt, "The politics of Indirect Rule...",p.284. 
46. T.B. Kabwegyere, The Politics of state Formation..." 
p. 217. 
47. A. Cohen, British politics in Changing Africa,p.18-19. 
48. Entebbe Secretariate Arcnives, SMP 8297 (o.s) paragra-
phs 68 - 84. 
49. Report of the East African Royal Commission Cmd 
2387, 1*25, p.73. 
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons 
Attribution - Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
